Is the Power of the RTC Unlimited? -- Federal Preemption of State Banking Law by Adams, David Whitney
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 4 Article 3
Summer 1991
Is the Power of the RTC Unlimited? -- Federal
Preemption of State Banking Law
David Whitney Adams
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
David W. Adams, Is the Power of the RTC Unlimited? -- Federal Preemption of State Banking Law, 18 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 995 (2017) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol18/iss4/3
IS THE POWER OF THE RTC UNLIMITED?-FEDERAL
PREEMPTION OF STATE BANKING LAW
DAVID WHITNEY ADAMS
O N August 9, 1989, Congress passed the most sweeping thrift re-
form law in the history of United States, the Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989.' Commonly
known as FIRREA, the law seeks to restore public confidence in the
savings and loan industry and to reorganize the insolvent Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).2 FIRREA created the
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) to resolve the cases of insolvent
or closed thrifts.' Congress gave the RTC broad powers to sell, merge,
or consolidate failed thrifts.4
In early 1990, the RTC announced that it would override state bank
branching laws for any financial institution that agreed to acquire a
failed thrift.5 The effect of such an override would be to increase the
value of the failed thrift because compliance with state branch bank-
ing law is both time-consuming and expensive. Furthermore, an RTC
override would create a nationwide pool of potential buyers. State
banking officials objected to the RTC's actions and argued that pre-
emption of state law is beyond the RTC's statutory authority. 6
This Comment examines the RTC's authority to override state law
for the purpose of selling a failed thrift. It analyzes the emergency
acquisition provisions of FIRREA, the RTC's authority to sell failed
thrifts, state branch banking laws, and the policy arguments for ena-
bling the RTC to sell failed thrifts quickly and efficiently. The Com-
ment also examines recent case law in the area.
I. THE SAVINGS AND LoAN CRISIS
Before FIRREA, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board supervised
the Federal Home Loan Bank system and the FSLIC. 7 In addition, the
1. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
2. H.R. REP. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 307, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmIN. NEws 86, 103 [hereinafter HousE REPORT].
3. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(b)(1), (3) (West Supp. 1990).
4. Id. § 1821(d)(2)(G) (West 1989).
5. See Retention of Thrift Branches Acquired by Banks in Emergency Acquisitions, 55
Fed. Reg. 13,543 (1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1611).
6. See infra notes 53-99 and accompanying text.
7. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 302.
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Federal Home Loan Bank Board administered a number of federal
laws. Among these was Title IV of the National Housing Act, which
authorized the insurance of the deposits of savings associations and
home financing institutions by the FSLIC.8
FIRREA grew out of the massive financial crisis of the thrift indus-
try and the insolvent FSLIC. 9 The crisis was caused by several factors
including regional economic collapse, fraud, and insider abuse. 0 The
purpose of FIRREA is to restore public confidence in the savings and
loan industry and to ensure that the industry is safe and stable." The
act also serves to provide a viable system for affordable housing fi-
nance. It was originally estimated that FIRREA would cost American
taxpayers about $100 billion; however, recent estimates have ranged
from a low of $500 billion to a high of over $1 trillion.' 2
A. Creation of the RTC and Its Receivership Strategy
Section 501 of FIRREA created the RTC and the RTC Oversight
Board to supervise it. The RTC was created, in part, to manage,
merge, sell, or liquidate certain conservatorships and receiverships. 3
The RTC is a wholly-owned government corporation subject to the
normal oversight and controls of the Government Corporations Act.'4
Furthermore, the RTC's operations are financed by the Resolution
Funding Corporation (REFCORP).' 5 The RTC and its Oversight
Board are temporary governmental entities. The Oversight Board will
be dissolved sixty days after it fulfills its responsibilities. 16 Similarly,
the RTC must be dissolved by December 31, 1996.17 If the RTC is still
acting as conservator or receiver as of that date, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) shall assume those roles as its succes-
sor.' 8
Congress intended that the RTC would develop a comprehensive
and systematic approach to the liquidation of insured insolvent thrift
institutions.' 9 Congress also wanted the RTC to develop a similar plan
8. Id. at 292-293.
9. Id. at 302-307.
10. Id. at 294.
11. Id. at 307; 12 U.S.C.A. § 1811 note (West 1989).
12. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REc. S10,182 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1990) (part II); HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 2, at 305-307; AM. BANKER, Oct. 31, 1990 at 2, col. 3.
13. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 356-357.
14. Id. at 442.
15. Id. at 366.
16. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(a)(15) (West Supp. 1990).
17. Id. § 1441a(o).
18. Id.
19. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 308.
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to dispose of the assets held by those failed thrifts. Congress believed
that the RTC would maximize proceeds on the sale of RTC receiver-
ship assets by selling complementary assets in pools. 20 Thus, a failed
savings association with several branches might be sold to another
savings association or bank as a single asset. Congress found that sell-
ing assets in groups would be attractive to a broader group of inves-
tors. Accordingly, investors might be willing to pay more for such
assets, and the RTC would be able to close failed thrift cases more
quickly.
B. The RTC's Broad Authority
The RTC is charged with resolving cases of failed thrifts which are
closed between January 1989 and August 1992.21 Section 217 of FIR-
REA adds to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act a new section (k). 22
The new section applies to emergency acquisitions of failed or failing
thrifts and grants the RTC broad authority to merge, consolidate, or
transfer the assets and liabilities of a failed thrift to any other savings
association or insured bank.3 An emergency acquisition is permitted
when the RTC determines that severe financial conditions "threaten
the stability of a significant number of savings associations, or of sav-
ings associations possessing significant financial resources." When
the RTC finds that such emergency conditions exist, the statute per-
mits the RTC to override state law in order to dispose of the failed
thrift.25 Furthermore, Congress authorized the RTC to transfer the as-
sets of failed thrifts "on such terms as the Corporation shall pro-
vide."26 In order to promote financial soundness, Congress prohibited
the RTC from authorizing any transaction which presents a substan-
tial risk to the savings association to be acquired or the acquiring en-
tity.27
If the RTC seeks to override state law, it must consult with the state
official who has jurisdiction over the acquired institution. 28 The offi-
cial must be given at least forty-eight hours to object to the use of the
override provisions in the statute. 29 If the official objects to the over-
20. Id. at 353.
21. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(b)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1990).
22. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217, 103 Stat. 183, 258 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(k)
(West 1989)).
23. Id. § 1823(k)(1)(A).
24. Id. § 1823(k)(l)(A)(i).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 1823(k)(1)(A)(ii).
27. Id. § 1823(k)(1)(A)(i).
28. Id. § 1823(k)(1)(B)(i).
29. Id. § 1823(k)(l)(B)(ii).
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ride, then the RTC may only override state law with a seventy-five
percent or greater vote of the Board of Directors of the Corporation.3 °
As soon as the decision is made to override state law, the RTC is re-
quired to send the state official a written certification of its determina-
tion."
Section 217 also regulates branching restrictions in emergency ac-
quisitions.3 2 It permits a savings association, after a merger or trans-
fer, to retain and operate existing branches and facilities.33 Further, it
provides that if the savings association continues to exist as a separate
entity, it may establish and operate new branches.3 4
Congress also granted broad rulemaking authority to the RTC to
enable it to carry out its statutory mandate. 5 It provides: "Subject to
the review of the Oversight Board, the [RTC] shall adopt the rules,
regulations, standards, policies, procedures, guidelines, and state-
ments necessary to implement the strategic plan established by the
Oversight Board under subsection (a)(14). ' '36 Furthermore, it requires
the RTC to: (1) maximize the net present value return from the sale of
insolvent thrifts; (2) minimize the impact of thrift transfers on local
financial and real estate markets; and (3) minimize the amount of any
loss in the resolution of cases.37 Section 1441a(b)(4) extends these
broad powers to the RTC in its conservatorship and receivership func-
tions. 8 It provides that the RTC shall have the same powers and rights
to carry out its duties with respect to institutions as those given to the
FDIC in sections 11, 12, and 13 of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act. 39 In other words, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act's state over-
ride powers are subsumed into section 1441a.
II. THE FIRST OVERRIDE CASE
When Mesa National Bank sought to acquire Valley Federal and
Mesa Federal, the State of Colorado filed the first challenge to section
1823(k). 40 Both Valley Federal Savings and Loan and Mesa Federal
30. Id. § 1823(k)(1)(B)(iii).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 1823(k)(4).
33. Id. § 1823(k)(4)(A).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 1441a(b)(12).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 1441a(b)(3)(C).
38. Id. § 1441a(b)(4).
39. Id. Sections 11, 12, and 13 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act are codified at 12
U.S.C.A. §§ 1821, 1822, 1823 (West 1989).
40. Colorado v. Resolution Trust Corp., No. 90-Z-190 (D. Colo. Feb. 14, 1990) (Westlaw,
1990 WL 51191), rev'd, 926 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1991).
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Savings and Loan were mutual associations in RTC conservatorship.
In addition to their respective principal offices, Valley Federal had
four branch offices and Mesa Federal had three branch offices. At the
time of the acquisition Mesa National Bank was not yet chartered by
the Comptroller of the Currency, the head of the federal agency re-
sponsible for the chartering and supervision of all national banks.4'
The agreement between the RTC and Mesa National Bank required
the bank to purchase certain assets and assume certain liabilities of
Valley Federal and Mesa Federal. 42 In addition, part of the agreement
provided that the newly-chartered Mesa National Bank would operate
preexisting branches of Valley Federal and Mesa Federal as its own
branches. 43
Colorado's state law prohibited branch banking except under lim-
ited circumstances." When the State Banking Board learned of the
RTC's proposed override of Colorado's branch banking laws, it
sought a temporary restraining order in the United States District
Court of Colorado.4 5 The Independent Bankers of Colorado, a non-
profit trade association, also joined the action on behalf of the state. 46
The court, in a ruling by Judge Rita Weinshienk, granted the state's
temporary restraining order. 47 The court found that section 36 of the
National Bank Act permitted a national banking association to estab-
lish and operate branches, but only if branch banking is expressly au-
thorized by state law.4" Furthermore, a literal reading of section
1823(k)(4)(A) led the court to conclude that the section only author-
ized a savings association, and not a bank, to retain and operate any
existing branches or other facilities of acquired failed thrifts. The
court reasoned that if the acquired thrift branches were to be operated
as branch banks, Congress would have had to repeal section 36 of the
National Banking Act. Because FIRREA did not repeal section 36 of
the National Bank Act, the court found that the state was likely to
succeed on the merits; therefore, the temporary restraining order was
appropriate.
49
41. Id. slip op. at 1.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. (citing CoLo. REv. STAT. § 11-6-101 (1987)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2.
48. Id. at 1; see McFadden Act, § 7, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988).
49. Colorado v. RTC, No. 90-Z-190, slip op. at 1-2.
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III. THE OVERRIDE RE ULATIoN-RTC's RESPONSE
After the RTC was enjoined from using the branching provisions of
section 1823(k)(4) in Colorado v. Resolution Trust Corp.,1° the RTC
published for comment a proposal to permit insured banks acquiring
branches of failed or failing thrifts to retain and operate such
branches as branches of the bank."
In its final regulation, the RTC adopted a rule that permitted in-
sured banks to retain and operate branches of insolvent thrifts ac-
quired pursuant to section 1823(k).12 In adopting the rule, the RTC
considered comments in thirty-seven letters sent by state banking regu-
lators, bankers, and trade associations. "The comment letters op-
posed the proposal on three principal grounds: (1) [t]he proposed rule
would undermine the dual banking system and the right of states to
determine their own bank branching policies; (2) FIRREA does not
permit the override of state bank branching law and does not grant
the RTC the authority to do so; and (3) the proposed rule violates the
procedural requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act53 by failing
to address the rule's impact on small entities." 5 4
A. Dual Banking System
The letters addressing the dual banking system were presumably
sent by small banks because the override regulation encouraged large
banks to expand into state bank markets by purchasing branches of
insolvent thrifts. With respect to the dual banking system, the RTC
recognized that the federal provisions in section 1823(k) might be in
direct conflict with state interests. However, the RTC found that the
emergency acquisition provisions contained in section 1823(k) ex-
pressed Congress's policy decision to override state interests in this
narrow and limited area, i.e., the sale of thrifts in conservatorship or
receivership with the RTC."5
B. Statutory Basis for the Regulation
The letters also contained several contentions that the RTC was ex-
ceeding its statutory authority by promulgating the regulation. First,
50. No. 90-Z-190.
51. Retention of Thrift Branches Acquired by Banks in Emergency Acquisitions, 55 Fed.
Reg. 13,543 (to be codified as amended at 12 C.F.R. § 1611) (1990)).
52. Retention of Thrift Branches Acquired by Banks in Emergency Acquisitions, 55 Fed.
Reg. 22,323 (1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1611).
53. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1988).
54. 55 Fed. Reg. at 22,324.
55. Id.
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some letters argued that section 1823(k) did not expressly authorize
the RTC to override state bank branching restrictions. Second, state-
ments by members of Congress were presented as evidence that Con-
gress did not intend to allow state branching laws to be preempted by
the emergency acquisition provision. Third, some parties argued that
because section 1823(k) does not expressly override the McFadden
Act, the RTC does not have the authority to permit national banks to
retain branches not authorized under state law. Fourth, some letters
disputed the RTC's claimed authority to fill the statutory silence in
section 1823(k) on the proper treatment of banks resulting from an
emergency acquisition. These letters argued that the RTC lacked rule-
making authority to propose regulations for emergency acquisitions in
which banks acquire failed savings associations . 6
1. Whether Section 13(k) Authorizes an Override of State Bank
Branching Laws
In its proposal, the RTC took the position that section 1823(k) ex-
pressly provides an override of state bank branching laws in order to
promote emergency acquisitions of failed thrifts.7 In pertinent part,
section 1823(k) states:
(4) If a merger, consolidation, transfer, or acquisition under this
subsection involves a savings association eligible for assistance and a
bank or bank holding company, a savings association may retain and
operate any existing branch or branches or any other existing
facilities. If the savings association continues to exist as a separate
entity, it may establish and operate new branches to the same extent
as any savings association that is not affiliated with a bank holding
company and the home office of which is located in the same State. 8
In its proposal, the RTC noted that the second sentence of the sub-
paragraph "sets out the future branching rights of an acquired savings
association that continues to exist as a separate entity following its
acquisition by a banking firm." 59 It continued: "By contrast, the first
sentence can most reasonably be read as addressing retention of
branches existing at the time of the emergency transaction.''6 Thus,
the issue presented by this section arose from the two plausible mean-
56. Id. at 22,324-22,325.
57. Retention of Thrifts Acquired by Banks in Emergency Acquisitions, 55 Fed. Reg.
13,543-13,544 (1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1611).
58. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(k)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
59. 55 Fed. Reg. at 13,544.
60. Id.
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ings of the term "savings association" in the second clause. The first
interpretation of the clause was a literal reading that when a savings
association was the entity resulting from a merger, then only the ac-
quired savings association, and not a bank, could operate the acquired
branches. This was the interpretation followed by the Colorado Dis-
trict Court in Colorado v. RTC.
The second plausible reading was explained in the proposed regula-
tion. The RTC's position was that a '[s]avings association' will not
necessarily be (and is highly unlikely to be) the result of a 'merger' or
'consolidation' of a bank and a thrift." 6 1 Therefore, the RTC claimed
that the term "savings association" should be "read as referring [to]
the savings association that has been merged or consolidated with a
bank, even though it is no longer a savings association." 62
The RTC favored the second interpretation, arguing that it more
closely followed the Congressional intent behind the emergency acqui-
sition provisions.63 The RTC explained that "[s]tate laws limiting
bank branching create a significant impediment to emergency acquisi-
tions" of failed thrifts by banks or bank holding companies.6 It also
noted that a banking firm is usually interested in acquiring the failed
thrift's branches so that the bank can operate the failed thrift offices
as branches of the bank. The RTC stated that "[tihe thrift branches
are a major asset" because it is much more costly for a bank to ex-
pand by establishing and chartering separate banks in each geographic
area it wishes to serve. 65 By acquiring the existing branches of a failed
thrift, the bank can expand by branching, an alternative that would
otherwise be "foreclosed to it by State branch banking restrictions. "6
According to the RTC, banks are willing to pay a substantial premium
for troubled thrifts if they can retain the failed thrift's branching net-
work .67
The RTC cited a recent example where "a prospective acquiror of
two troubled thrifts with seven branches was initially willing to pay a
premium of $675,000 for the thrifts provided the branch network
could be retained and operated as bank branches. However, the
bank's bid was reduced to a premium of $75,000 when it was required
to convert the branches to seven separately chartered and individually
61. Id.
62. Id.
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capitalized banks."" The RTC pointed out that the money lost in this
sale could have been applied to reduce the amount of taxpayer dollars
necessary to resolve other failed thrift cases. 69
2. Legislative History That Section 1823(k) Does Not Override
State Branch Banking Law
A number of those who wrote letters commenting on the proposed
rule took the position that the legislative history of FIRREA does not
sanction RTC override of state bank branching law. 70 Specifically,
these letters pointed to comments made in the Congressional Record
between Senators Wirth and Riegle, and a statement by Congressman
Leach during the debate on the Conference bill. The pertinent parts of
the Congressional Record state:
Mr. Wirth: Mr. President... I would like to ask the distinguished
chairman of the Banking Committee, Senator Riegle, to clarify
provisions in the legislation concerning the conversion of thrift
charters to bank charters.
Is it correct that the provisions of this act that permit thrifts to be
converted to banks are not intended to allow banks resulting from
such conversions to establish, retain, maintain or operate branches
that do not comply with the laws relative to establishment and
operation of bank branches or offices in the respective States where
such banks are located?
Mr. Riegle: The Senator's statement is correct. 7'
In the House debate Congressman Leach stated:
[T]he record should be clear on the following items: First, that
provisions of this act that permit thrifts to be converted to thrifts72
[sic] are not intended to allow banks resulting from such conversions
to establish, retain, maintain, or operate branches that do not
comply with the laws relative to establishment and operation of bank
branches or offices in the respective states where such banks are
operated. In other words, the Douglas or McFadden Acts are not
intended to be circumvented or modified by this statute. 73
68. Id. at 13,544.
69. Id.
70. Retention of Thrift Branches by Banks in Emergency Acquisitions, 55 Fed. Reg.
22,323, 22,324-22,325 (1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1611).
71. 135 CoNo. Rnc. S10,200 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989).
72. This word should probably be "banks" instead of "thrifts."
73. 135 CoNo. Rlc. H4,980 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989).
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The RTC countered that although these statements appear to sup-
port the view that state branch banking laws should be respected, two
factors indicate that they apply to non-emergency transactions. First,
both of the statements expressly refer to provisions of the Conference
Report that addressed charter conversions. Charter conversions were
explained in the Conference Report at page 394. Although emergency
acquisitions are a special type of charter conversion, the Conference
Report addressed emergency acquisitions several pages later at page
398 under the caption "FDIC's Assistance and Default Prevention
Authority." Therefore, the RTC reached the conclusion that if the
legislators were speaking about the emergency acquisitions, they
would not have referred to the Conference Report discussing charter
conversions. 74
The second reason the RTC found the legislative history non-per-
suasive was that the Senate Report to Senate Bill S. 77475 made it
"very clear that the scope of the state law override authority in section
13(k) was intended to be very broad. The Report states that '[slection
13(k) can be used to override all State law (including State constitu-
tions), with one exception: section 13(k) does not override State laws
that restrict the activities of a savings association on behalf of any
other entity. '76 The RTC found the statutory language in section
1823(k) consistent with this report, especially in subparagraphs
(1)(A)(i) and (ii) which provide that the RTC may permit emergency
transactions "[n]otwithstanding any provision of state law" and "on
such terms as the [Corporation] shall provide." 77 Based on this analy-
sis, the RTC concluded that Congress intended to allow the RTC to
override state branch banking laws when the acquiring entity of a
failed thrift is a bank.78
3. Whether the Proposed Rule Is Consistent with The McFadden
Act
Some letters protesting the new rule contended that the RTC pro-
posal was inconsistent with the McFadden Act. 79 The McFadden Act
generally provides that a national bank can establish and operate
branches, but only if branch banking is expressly authorized by state
74. 55 Fed. Reg. at 22,326.
75. S. 774, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), is the source of section 1823(k).
76. 55 Fed. Reg. at 22,326 (quoting S. REP. No. 19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 320 (1989)).
77. Id. (citing FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217, 103 Stat. 183, 258 (1989) (codified at 12
U.S.C.A. § 1823(k) (West 1989)).
78. Id.
79. Id. The McFadden Act is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 36.
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law. The RTC stated that this argument assumes the McFadden Act is
the exclusive source of branching authority for national banks. The
RTC then discussed several federal provisions which show that the
McFadden Act is not the sole authority for branch banking. 8°
First, the RTC pointed to section 13(f) of the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act, which is codified as section 1823(f) of Title 12.81 This sec-
tion "authorizes emergency interstate acquisitions of insured banks
which are in danger of default, ' 82 and provides that banks resulting
from emergency acquisitions "may retain and operate any existing
branch or branches of the institutions merged with or acquired, but
otherwise shall be subject to the conditions upon which a national
bank may establish and operate branches in the State in which such
insured institution is located.''83 According to the RTC, section
1823(f) clearly establishes that the McFadden Act is not the sole au-
thority for branch banking and that section 1823(f) provides addi-
tional branching authority. The RTC reasoned that, just as section
1823(f) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act grants branching author-
ity to the FDIC, section 1823(k) of FIRREA also grants similar au-
thority to the RTC for branch banking in addition to the McFadden
Act. Therefore, the RTC concluded "the matter of whether section
1823(k) overrides the McFadden Act is irrelevant.' "8
4. The RTC's Authority to Fill the Statutory Silence
In Colorado v. RTC, the district court granted a temporary re-
straining order against the RTC, concluding that section 1823(k)(4)(A)
precluded a bank from retaining and operating thrift branches where
an acquired thrift is merged into a bank. This case stemmed from a
literal reading of section 1823(k)(4)(A), which section states in perti-
nent part: "If a merger, consolidation, transfer, or acquisition under
this subsection involves a savings association eligible for assistance
and a bank or bank holding company, a savings association may re-
tain and operate any existing branch or branches or any other existing
facilities. "8
The district court in Colorado held that the section authorized only
a resulting "savings association" to continue to operate existing
80. Id.
81. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(0 (1988).
82. Retention of Thrift Branches Acquired by Banks in Emergency Acquisitions, 55 Fed.
Reg 22,323, 22,326 (1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1611).
83. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1823(0 (1989)) (emphasis added).
84. Id.
85. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(k)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
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branches or other facilities. However, as discussed in this Comment,"
the RTC, in its regulation, took the position that it is unlikely for a
savings association to result from the merger of a failed savings asso-
ciation and a national bank. Relying upon the court's literal reading
of the statute, the RTC concluded that section 1823(k) is silent on the
subject of failed thrifts merging with banks when the resulting entities
are banks. The RTC asserted that because the statute is silent, it has
the authority to promulgate a rule to fill the resulting void.8 7
To support its position, the RTC first argued that an agency's au-
thority to preempt state law when promulgating rules need not be ex-
plicit. s8 Notwithstanding. Lincoln Savings & Loan Association v.
Federal Home Loan Bank Board,8 9 the RTC pointed to its branch
rulemaking authority under FIRREA 90 which permits the RTC to "is-
sue such rules [and] regulations ... as the Corporation considers nec-
essary or appropriate to carry out this section." 9' Furthermore, the
RTC noted that section 501 also gives the RTC the power to issue
such regulations "as it determines to be appropriate regarding the
conduct of [failed thrifts]. "92 Therefore, the RTC, under Mourning v.
Family Publications Service,93 concluded that it could issue any rule
which is "reasonably related to the purposes of its enabling legisla-
tion."94 The RTC explained:
Here, the RTC is issuing a regulation under broad rulemaking
authority and pursuant to clear legislative intent that emergency
acquisitions of thrifts not be frustrated by conflicting state law.
Because its regulation is authorized, it can override a state law that
either conflicts with the regulation or frustrates its purpose.9 5
Based on the above, the RTC concluded its regulation was legitimate
and should override conflicting state law.
86. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
87. 55 Fed. Reg. at 13,544. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(b)(12)(A) (West Supp. 1990).
88. 55 Fed. Reg. at 22,327 (quoting Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan
Bank Bd., 856 F.2d 1558, 1560 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
89. 856 F.2d 1558.
90. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(b)(12)(A).
91. 55 Fed. Reg at 22,327. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(b)(12).
92. Id.
93. 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
94. Id. at 369 (quoting Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-281 (1969)).
See also 55 Fed. Reg. at 22,326-22,327.
95. 55 Fed. Reg. at 22,327.
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C. The Regulatory Flexibility Act
The last objection to the proposed Rule was that it violated the Reg-
ulatory Flexibility Act. 96 Generally, the Regulatory Flexibility Act re-
quires that an administrative rule should not have a "significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities." 9 The
RTC interpreted this challenge as an argument that the proposed rule
"would grant an 'unfair competitive advantage to a select, limited
number of banks.'"
The RTC, in its final regulation, quickly disposed of this objection;
the final rule does not impose compliance requirements on depository
institutions of any size. Accordingly, the rule would not adversely im-
pact small institutions. Furthermore, the RTC stated that its rule im-
posed no reporting or recording requirements nor any other type of
restriction which would harshly affect small entities. Therefore, it
concluded that the rule would not have the type of economic impact
addressed by the Regulatory Flexibility Act.99
IV. CASES AFTER THE OVERRIDE REGULATION
Within three months after the RTC promulgated a final version of
its proposed regulation, several cases were decided by the federal
courts regarding section 1823(k) emergency acquisitions. Two district
courts reviewed section 1823(k) emergency acquisitions and came to
opposite results. In Independent Community Bankers of New Mexico
v. Resolution Trust Corporation,t°° the New Mexico District Court
dismissed the Independent Bankers' claim, giving deference to the
RTC's override regulation. However, in Arkansas State Bank Com-
missioner v. Resolution Trust Corporation,"°  Judge Reasoner held
that the RTC's interpretation of section 1823(k) overstepped the au-
thority granted to it by FIRREA. Seven weeks later the Arkansas dis-
trict court decision was reversed and vacated by the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals.'°2 The Eighth Circuit opinion included a strong dis-
sent by Judge Heaney who would have affirmed the district court.
96. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1988).
97. Id.
98. 55 Fed. Reg. at 22,327.
99. Id.
100. No. CIV-90-532 SC (D.N.M. June 15, 1990) (Westlaw, 1990 WL 119633), aff'd sub
nom State ex rel Colorado State Banking Bd. v. RTC, 926 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1991).
101. 745 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Ark.), vacated, 911 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1990).
102. Arkansas State Bank Comm'r v. Resolution Trust Corp., 911 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1990).
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A. Independent Community Bankers of New Mexico v. RTC
In Independent Community Bankers, the District Court of New
Mexico upheld the RTC override of state branching law. In that case,
New Mexico Federal, a failed savings association in conservatorship
with the RTC, had its main office in Albuquerque and branches in
Santa Fe, Taos and Espanola, New Mexico. First National Bank of
New Mexico made a bid to purchase New Mexico Federal expressly
conditioned upon the RTC overriding the New Mexico branch bank-
ing statute. The New Mexico statute permitted branch banking only
on a county-wide basis.103
As in Colorado, the RTC argued that First National's acquisition of
New Mexico Federal would be an emergency acquisition under section
1823(k). Accordingly, under subsection (4), First National would be
permitted to operate the four offices of New Mexico Federal as bank-
ing branches of First National Bank. The agreement was in direct con-
travention of the New Mexico bank branching statute because the
branches would be operated outside of the county-wide restriction im-
posed by New Mexico banking law.'04
Around May 30, 1990, the Executive Director of the RTC notified
Kenneth Carson, New Mexico's chief banking regulator, of the RTC's
intent to override New Mexico's branch banking statute. The next day
Mr. Carson advised the RTC of the state's objection to the proposed
override. Notwithstanding the state's objection, the RTC advised First
National and the State of New Mexico that it intended to consummate
the proposed purchase and assumption agreement with First Na-
tional.' o5
On June 5, 1990, the RTC Board of Directors "unanimously au-
thorized the override of New Mexico's branch banking laws and ap-
proved the bid" of First National for the acquisition of the assets and
liabilities of New Mexico Federal.' °6 In accordance with the proce-
dural requirements of section 1823(k), the Board found "severe finan-
cial conditions existed relative to the thrift industry nationwide and
threatened the stability of a significant number of saving associa-
tions."' 7 Furthermore, the Board found that such savings associa-
tions possessed significant financial resources justifying the use of the
authority granted to the RTC under section 1823(k). The Board also
found that severe financial conditions threatened savings associations
103. Independent Community Bankers, No. CIV-90-532 SC, slip op. at 1.
104. New Mexico's branch banking statute is at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-5-3 (1978).
105. No. CIV-90-532SC, slip op. at 1.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2.
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in New Mexico, especially those in Albuquerque. Last, the Board
found that the purchase of New Mexico Federal by First National
"would lessen the risk to the RTC and that such authorization would
not present a substantial risk to the safety and soundness of the sav-
ings association to be acquired" or to First National Bank, the acquir-
ing entity. t0
In its conclusions of law, the court recognized that the RTC pos-
sessed broad authority to dispose of any thrift in receivership or con-
servatorship. The court also noted that the RTC is required by
Congress to maximize the net present value return from the disposi-
tion of failed institutions and to minimize any loss realized in the reso-
lution of failed thrift cases. Further, the court held that the RTC was
given power by Congress to promulgate any rules and regulations it
considered necessary to carry out its statutory mandate. Last, the
court held that FIRREA gives the RTC great latitude in disposing of
failed thrifts, noting that the RTC had the power to "dictate the
'terms' of any merger, consolidation, or transfer of assets under 12
U.S.C. § 1823(k)."'19 Therefore, the court concluded that the RTC
was entitled to "issue any rule that was 'reasonably related to the pur-
poses of its enabling legislation."' 10
The court then discussed the RTC's final regulation and concluded
that the regulation was properly promulgated and adopted."' After
concluding that the regulation was within the RTC's rulemaking
power, the court stated that the test for a reviewing court was lim-
ited-the regulation must be upheld unless it is "beyond the outer-
most boundaries of the statute."" 2 Furthermore, the court cited
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council' for the
proposition that substantive regulations by an administrative agency
are "given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.' 4
After delineating the tests above, the court applied them to the reg-
ulation and concluded that "the Override Regulation implementing
the statute by permitting retention of branches as part of an emer-
gency transaction is without question 'reasonably related to the pur-
poses of the enabling legislation' and is valid. The
Override Regulation is not 'out of harmony,' but is consistent with
108. Id.
109. Id. at 3.
110. Id. at 2, (citing Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973)).
111. Id. at 3.
112. Id. (citing Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44-45 (1981)).
113. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
114. Independent Community Bankers, No. CIV-90-532 SC, slip op. at 3.
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§ 1823(k)."1 5 The court bolstered its conclusion by finding that the
legislative history of section 1823(k) evidenced Congress's intent to
give the RTC broad powers to override state law to facilitate emer-
gency acquisitions. " 6 Finally, the court upheld the override regulation
and approved the RTC's statutory construction of section 1823(k)(4)
regarding the term "savings association." ' 17 Accordingly, because it
found the regulation valid, the court dismissed the bankers' claim un-
der rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted."I8
B. Arkansas State Bank Commissioner v. RTC
Within a month, the District Court of Arkansas, in Arkansas State
Bank Commissioner v. Resolution Trust Corporation,"9 reached the
opposite conclusion when reviewing the RTC's override regulation. In
that case, the RTC scheduled a meeting to solicit bids from potential
purchasers of failed savings and loan associations in Arkansas. Dur-
ing this meeting, the RTC announced to potential bidders that section
1823(k) authorized the RTC to preempt Arkansas's branch banking
statute.12' On June 21, 1990, Worthen Bank and Trust Company sub-
mitted a bid to purchase the assets and liabilities of Independence
Federal Bank; Worthen's bid was expressly contingent on the RTC's
ability to override state branching law so that Worthen could operate
Independence's twenty branch offices, located in fifteen counties
throughout Arkansas, as branches of Worthen.' 2
In determining whether the RTC's override regulation was valid,
the court looked to the statutory language in sections
1823(k)(1)(A)(i)(I) and 1823(k)(4). 22 The court noted that section
1823(k)(1) spoke only of transferring a savings association's assets to
a bank. It found that the statute was devoid of language pertaining to
the operation of those assets as branches after the transfer. 2
Moreover, the court also analyzed section 1823(k)(4) and construed
the meaning of "savings association" as it is used there.'2 Following
115. Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 4-5.
118. Id. at 6.
119. 745 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Ark.), rev'd, 911 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1990).
120. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 23-32-1202 (West Supp. 1989). This statute provides that bank-
ing institutions may not operate branches outside the county in which the institution's principal
banking office is located.
121. Arkansas State Bank Comm'r, 745 F. Supp. at 552.
122. Id. at 553-554.
123. Id. at 553.
124. Id.
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the approach of the court in Colorado v. RTC, the Arkansas court
noted that the section spoke only of an acquired savings association
being allowed to retain and operate its branches, not of a bank being
allowed to do so. It stated that the statute "says nothing about a bank
converting those branches to bank branches and so operating
them."' 25 Based on his restrictive reading of those two subsections,
Judge Reasoner disagreed with the New Mexico District Court's con-
struction of the term "savings association" in section 1823(k)(4)., 26
The Arkansas court found the RTC's interpretation of sections
1823(k)(1) and (k)(4) implausible because such a reading would render
useless the portion of the statute reading, "a savings association may
retain and operate any existing branch or branches or any other exist-
ing facilities. "127
The court held that the RTC had clearly overstepped its authority in
issuing the override regulation.'2 Because the RTC had exceeded its
statutory authority, the court held that the override regulation was un-
lawful and therefore null and void. The court further enjoined the
RTC from approving the establishment of branch banks in violation
of state branch banking laws. 129
C. Eighth Circuit Review of the Arkansas Case
Judge Reasoner's opinion declaring the RTC's override regulation
invalid had been on the books for seven weeks when it was reversed
by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 30 The case was heard before
a three judge panel, with Judges Gibson and Magill comprising the
majority. Senior Circuit Judge Heaney wrote a well-reasoned dissent
directly contradicting the majority.'
1. The Majority Opinion
The facts of the case were taken primarily from the district court
order, with one important exception. On appeal, the court noted that
125. Id. at 554.
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(k)(4)(A) (West 1989)). This led the court to say:
It is obvious to this Court that Section (k)(4) means that after an acquisition, existing
branches may be retained and operated if they are maintained and operated as
branches of a savings association. This court agrees with the Colorado District Court
that they cannot be retained and operated as branches of the acquiring bank.
745 F. Supp. at 555.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 556.
130. Arkansas State Bank Comm'r v Resolution Trust Corp., 911 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1990).
131. Id. at 175 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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Worthen Bank's bid included a premium of $1.5 million for acquiring
all of the branches of Independence Federal together.3 2 The majority
concluded that Worthen's proposed acquisition of Independence and
its twenty branches was authorized under the emergency acquisition
statute, section 1823(k). The court stated that the issue was whether
section 1823(k)(4) provides statutory authorization for the RTC to
promulgate the override regulation.'
The court adopted the standard for reviewing the RTC's regulation
contained in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil. 1 4 The Chevron standard requires the court to first determine
whether Congress has spoken to the question at issue. If Congress has
spoken, then the court and the agency must give effect to Congres-
sional intent. However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with re-
spect to the issue, then the court need only determine whether the
agency's regulation is a permissible construction of the statute. The
agency's construction of the statute is permissible unless it is arbi-
trary, capricious, or manifestlycontrary to the statute . 35
The majority found that Congress had not spoken to the precise
issue in question so the issue could not be disposed of by the first part
of the Chevron inquiry. The court then considered whether the over-
ride regulation was a permissible construction of the statute.'3 6
In examining the override regulation, the court noted the three sec-
tions of FIRREA which defined the RTC's power in arranging emer-
gency acquisitions. First, the RTC has the power to issue regulations
to carry out its statutory purpose; 3 7 second, section 144la(b)(3) re-
quires the RTC to maximize the value received for the failed thrift
while minimizing any losses to the federal fisc; 38 and third, the RTC
has specific authority to arrange transfers of assets "on such terms as
the [RTC] shall provide.' ' 39 The court also examined the Commis-
sioner's arguments that the regulation was beyond the scope of the
RTC's authority, but concluded "we are satisfied that the RTC could
permissibly read these sections as authority to promulgate 12 C.F.R. §
1611.1 overriding branch banking law incident to such [emergency ac-
quisition] transactions." 4
132. Id. at 162.
133. Id. at 164.
134. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
135. Arkansas State Bank Comm'r, 911 F.2d at 165-66.
136. Id. at 166.
137. Id. at 168 (citing 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(b)(12)(A) (West Supp. 1990)).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 168-169. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(k)(l)(A)(ii).
140. 911F.2d at169.
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Although the court approved the RTC's override regulation, it still
felt compelled to interpret the term "savings association" in section
1823(k)(4).141 The Commissioner insisted that the second usage of
"savings association" in the first sentence meant exactly what it
said-'"any corporation (other than a bank)."' 4 He argued that else-
where in FIRREA, when Congress intended to refer to banks as well
as savings associations, Congress used the term "an insured deposi-
tory institution."' 43 Therefore, the Commissioner's position was that
the statute meant that a savings association, and not a bank, may re-
tain and operate the existing branches of the thrift.'"
The RTC's position was stated in the override regulation. It argued
that the term "savings association" in the second clause referred to
the "savings association" as it existed prior to the consummation of
the emergency transaction even though it might no longer be a savings
association 14 because "if the clause is not read this way, merger and
consolidation are effectively read out of the statute."' The majority
also found the RTC's interpretation of the statute more persuasive:
We could at this point simply conclude that the second usage of
"savings association" is ambiguous, and that the RTC reached a
permissible construction of the statute in adopting section 1611.1 as
did the district court for the district of New Mexico in Independent
Community Bankers of New Mexico v. Resolution Trust Corp. We
are convinced, however, that the arguments asserted by the RTC
have more compelling force than those to the contrary, giving strong
support to the construction of the statute by the RTC, and that the
district court erred in its ruling on this issue. 47
The court took particular notice of the illogic in the Commissioner's
argument that if a bank cannot retain and operate the branches as
141. Id. at 171. For purposes of clarity, this subparagraph is set out again:
If a merger, consolidation, transfer, or acquisition under this subsection involves a
savings association eligible for assistance and a bank or bank holding company, a
savings association may retain and operate any existing branch or branches or any
other existing facilities. If the savings association continues to exist as a separate en-
tity, it may establish and operate new branches to the same extent as any savings
association that is not affiliated with a bank holding company and the home office of
which is located in the same State.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(k)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
142. 911 F.2d at 171. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1813(b) (defining "savings association").
143. 911 F.2d at 171. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1817,1818,1821.
144. 911 F.2d at 171.
145. Id. (citing 55 Fed. Reg. 13,543-13,544).
146. Id.
147. Id. (citations omitted).
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bank branches, then no merger or consolidation can occur. Therefore,
the majority held that the RTC reached a permissible interpretation of
section 1823(k) as statutory authority to promulgate the override regu-
lation. I"
2. Judge Heaney's dissent
Judge Heaney wrote a strong dissent criticizing nearly every one of
the RTC's arguments in the case. 149 In essence, he would have af-
firmed the district court because the statute contains no ambiguity. In
his opinion, section 1823(k)(4) does not permit a bank which acquires
more than one savings and loan association to convert the acquired
association into branches of the acquiring bank. He emphasized the
following language of the statute: "a saving association may retain
and operate any existing branch or branches or any other existing fa-
cilities." 50 He believed that this language fit the Worthen transaction
exactly-Worthen Bank was permitted to acquire the assets of Inde-
pendence Federal, but could only operate the branches of Independ-
ence "to the extent that the acquired association retains its identity"
as a savings association. 5' Thus, he concluded that Worthen could
not operate Independence's branches as bank branches. Judge Heaney
emphasized that Congress could have authorized an acquiring bank to
convert acquired savings associations into branches, but did not.
Therefore, he reasoned, neither the RTC nor the court had the au-
thority to re-write the statute to accomplish a goal not permitted by
the statute itself. Furthermore, neither the court nor the RTC had a
right to create an ambiguity where none existed. 5 2
Judge Heaney's dissent became more compelling when he intro-
duced the tortured history surrounding the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency's many attempts to thwart the McFadden Act in order to permit
national banks to branch across state lines, thereby avoiding state
branch banking laws.' He asserted that, as early as 1920, the Comp-
troller of the Currency was attempting to circumvent state branch
banking laws so that national banks could expand into areas where
state banks traditionally predominated. Indeed, one such early at-
tempt was rejected by the United States Supreme Court when it "held
that national banks did not have the implied power to branch."' 5 4 The
148. Id. at 172.
149. Id. at 175 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
150. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(k)(4)(A) (West 1989)) (emphasis deleted).
151. Id. (emphasis in original).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 179.
154. Id. at 176-177 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri ex rel Barret, 263 U.S. 640 (1924)).
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year before this decision, the Comptroller argued that if state banks
were to continue to practice unlimited branch banking, it would even-
tually destroy the national banking system.'"
Judge Heaney asserted that the Comptroller since that time has reg-
ularly certified national banks to open branch facilities in states where
such action was in contravention of the state branch banking laws and
cited nine cases in which the Eighth Circuit or the Supreme Court had
overruled the Comptroller's decisions to establish national bank
branches in states where branch banking was restricted."16 These cases
and the Comptroller's past efforts "offer a historical perspective from
which much can be gleaned. 11 7 Thus, he concluded that the RTC rule
was yet another attempt by the Comptroller, aided by the RTC, to
circumvent the branch banking provisions of the McFadden Act. As
such, the rule should be declared invalid." 8
Judge Heaney also argued that Congress did not intend for banks
to operate acquired savings associations as branches, citing the confer-
ence committee report on the bill. Specifically, he highlighted the fol-
lowing passage:
The amendments also remove the procedures under current law that
give priority to in-State thrift acquirers of failing thrifts. The
acquisition of failing thrifts by banks or bank holding companies is
authorized. A thrift subsidiary of a bank or bank holding company
may branch in the same manner as a savings association (not
affiliated with a bank holding company) that has its home office in
the same state as the home office of such thrift subsidiary. 9
Judge Heaney asserted that this passage suggests that if Worthen
Bank had acquired Independence as a subsidiary, then Worthen could
have operated the acquired branches in the same manner as Independ-
ence Federal operated the branches before the acquisition. In other
words, Worthen could only operate Independence's branches if it re-
tained the Independence name and identity.' °
Finally, he disagreed with the majority's reliance on the Chevron
inquiry and rulemaking arguments because he found that the statute
contains no ambiguity. Judge Heaney agreed that Chevron is applica-
155. Id. at 176. See also H.R. Doc. No. 90, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1924).
156. Id. at 176-77.
157. Id. at 177.
158. Id. at 179.
159. Id. at 178 (citing H. CoNF. REP. No. 222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 398 (1989), reprinted in
1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMuN. NEws 432, 437)) (emphasis in case).
160. Id.
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ble when a statute is either silent or ambiguous on the issue in ques-
tion. Equally so, an agency can only promulgate a rule when the
agency has been given authority and there is an ambiguity or silence in
the statute. However, because section 1823(k)(4) is not ambiguous,
neither the RTC nor the court should be able to bootstrap itself into a
position where it can fill a gap or resolve an ambiguity where none
exists.16' Accordingly, the dissent concluded that Chevron was inappli-
cable to the case and that the RTC was powerless to promulgate a rule
in contravention of congressional intent. ,62
D. Tenth Circuit Review of the Colorado and New Mexico Cases
On February 11, 1991, the Tenth Circuit rendered a decision review-
ing the Colorado and New Mexico district court decisions in State ex
rel Colorado State Banking Board v. Resolution Trust Corporation.163
The court was confronted with a split between the Colorado and New
Mexico district courts in their interpretation of section 1823. The New
Mexico district court had determined that the override regulation was
a valid exercise of the RTC's rulemaking authority while the Colorado
district court had held that the regulation was void and contrary to
FIRREA. The majority affirmed the New Mexico decision and re-
versed the Colorado decision.'" Judge Ebel wrote a long dissent criti-
cizing the majority's statutory construction and standard of review. 165
1. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion was organized in five major sections. 6 The
first section discussed the majority's standard of review; the second
analyzed subsection (k)(1) of section 1823; the third analyzed the
branching provisions under subsection (k)(4); the fourth applied the
Chevron standard of review; and the fifth discussed the impact of the
McFadden Act upon emergency acquisitions under FIRREA. The ma-
jority opinion was drafted by Circuit Judge Anderson, and was joined
by Circuit Judge Baldock. 167
161. Id. at 179.
162. Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (courts must reject administrative constructions
that are contrary to clear congressional intent)).
163. 926 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1991).
164. Id. at 948.
165. Id. at 948-55 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
166. The court opinion also contains a section addressing the Regulatory Flexibility Act;
however, this is not considered a material portion of the opinion. See id. at 947.
167. Id. at 933.
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In the first section the majority set forth the standard of review . 6
Like the Eighth Circuit in Arkansas State Bank Commissioner,16 9 the
Tenth Circuit adopted the Chevron inquiry. 170 Under that inquiry, the
majority noted that if Congress has directly spoken to the precise is-
sue, the court should effectuate Congress's clear intent. If, however,
the court determines that Congress has not spoken to the precise issue,
the court should decide whether the administrative agency's interpre-
tation of the statute is permissible. If there is no direct congressional
intent, the court must defer to the administrative agency's construc-
tion of the statute if that construction is permissible. 171
The court came to differing conclusions in its application of the
Chevron analysis to subsections (k)(1) and (k)(4). 172 The majority
found subsection (k)(4) intractably ambiguous and concluded that the
section contains no clear expression of congressional intent. On the
other hand, it found subsection (k)(1) clear and unambiguous and
concluded that (k)(1) gave the RTC clear congressional authorization
to override state branch banking law. Therefore, the court reasoned,
the RTC's override regulation was a valid exercise of the RTC's statu-
tory authority. 171
In the second section of the opinion the court rejected the states'
argument that the RTC's authority under 1823(k)(1) extended only to
the acquisitions themselves and not to the post-acquisition operation
of the thrift branches.174 It found that the distinction between pre- and
post-acquisition activities was not supported in the statute, focusing
on a state's ability to impede an emergency acquisition.' 71
The court found that post-acquisition state branch banking laws im-
pede emergency acquisitions. Although it recognized that an acquiring
bank has the option of operating the acquired offices as thrift subsidi-
aries or as independently chartered and capitalized banks, the court
dismissed this point because "these choices are not the logical or likely
result of the acquisition." 1 76
It reasoned that an interpretation of 1823(k)(1) that did not condi-
tion mergers between banks and failing thrifts upon subsequent dives-
168. Id. at 936.
169. 911 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1990).
170. Colorado State Banking Bd., 926 F.2d at 936; see Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
171. Colorado State Banking Bd., 926 F.2d at 936.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 937.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 938.
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titure of all the acquired thrift's offices would rob the term "merger"
of its most basic meaning. 7 7 Therefore, when failing thrifts are ab-
sorbed into banks, they cease to exist as thrifts and their branches
cannot continue to be operated as thrift branches; they must become
bank branches. 7 1
The court rejected the states' argument that "merger," under FIR-
REA, is a term of art and does not carry its ordinary meaning, citing
banking and case law to show that the term did not have a special
meaning. 79 Then it recognized that the emergency acquisitions in
these cases were not mergers, but rather transfers of assets. The ma-
jority refused to read section (k)(1) to require banks to separately
charter and capitalize these acquired assets or thrift branches.'1°
The third section of the opinion addressed section 1823(k)(4), the
branching provision.'' The court concluded that the subsection ad-
dressed the retention of existing offices and the creation of new
branches after an emergency acquisition.8 2 It went on to disagree with
both the states' and the RTC's interpretations of the provision. The
exact meaning of "savings association" was the crux of the dispute. 8
The states' position was that only a savings association which sur-
vived the merger as a subsidiary could operate the bank branches.
Thus, a resulting bank would be precluded from operating the pur-
chased thrift's offices as branches of the bank.' 4 The court concluded
that subsection (k)(4) did not clearly support this interpretation; there-
fore, Congress did not unambiguously express an intent that resulting
banks could not retain existing thrift offices and operate them as bank
branches. 18 5
The RTC argued that subparagraph (a)'s first sentence meant that
"a resulting entity may retain and operate any existing
branch ... .,,96 Again, the court disagreed: "[Wihile it is possible
that Congress intended this result, this construction requires even
more gloss than does the States' construction."'' 87 In the alternative,
the RTC argued that the subsection was silent as to the subsequent
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 938-39.
180. Id. at 939-41.
181. Id. at 941.
182. Id. at 942.
183. Id. at 942-44.
184. Id. at 942-43.
185. Id. at 943.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 943-44
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operation of thrift branches as bank branches. The court agreed with
the RTC that the statute was either silent or ambiguous. '88
The court applied the Chevron inquiry in section four of its opin-
ion, noting first that the ambiguity of subsection (k)(4) would not af-
fect the analysis of subsection (k)(l). 8 9 With respect to subsection
(k)(1), the court found that the statute expressly gave the RTC the
statutory authority to override state law to accomplish the acquisition
and that subsection (k)(4) contained no express language. Under the
Chevron inquiry then, Congress's unambiguous intent must be given
effect. Therefore, the court held that FIRREA authorizes the RTC to
override state branch banking laws that preclude banks which acquire
thrifts in emergency acquisitions from retaining and operating the
thrifts' former offices as bank branches. The court held that the over-
ride regulation is a valid exercise of the RTC's authority.190
In the last major section of the majority opinion, the court dis-
cussed the impact of the McFadden Act' 9' on the override regula-
tion. 9 It noted that the purpose of the McFadden Act was "to place
national and state banks on a basis of 'competitive equality' insofar as
branch banking was concerned."' 93 The court recognized that the Act
was a compromise in "maintaining restraints on national banks'
branching while allowing them just enough flexibility to compete with
state banks."'94
The states had taken the position that the McFadden Act prevented
the RTC from overriding state bank branching laws.'" However, the
court stated that the McFadden Act was not assaulted by the override
regulation because the regulation applied equally to both state and na-
tional banks. Indeed, the court concluded, the states' interpretation
would effectively subvert competitive equality. It reasoned: "Thus,
the Override Regulation would have the bizarre effect of requiring na-
tional banks to follow state branching restrictions that the state banks
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 945. The majority also noted that even if both provisions were silent regarding the
specific issue of overriding state branch banking law, the majority would have still upheld the
RTC's interpretation of FIRREA. The majority based its "statutory silence" holding on the
RTC's explicit authority to issue rules, regulations and statements necessary to carry out FIR-
REA. Id. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(b)(12)(A) (West Supp. 1990).
191. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988); see supra notes 79-84, 153-158 and accompanying text.
192. Colorado State Banking Bd., 926 F.2d at 945-47.
193. Id. at 946 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S.
252, 261 (1966)).
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were not required to follow."' 96 Therefore, the court held that the
override regulation preserved the McFadden Act's motivating princi-
ple of competitive equality between state and national banking institu-
tions. 97
In summary, the majority opinion expressly held that FIRREA au-
thorized the RTC to override any state branch banking law that would
preclude banks that obtain failed or failing thrifts through emergency
acquisitions from retaining and operating the thrifts' offices as bank
branches. It further held that the override regulation did not violate
the McFadden or Regulatory Flexibility Act. "98
2. Judge Ebel's Dissent
Judge Ebel respectfully dissented from the majority opinion.' 99 He
found that after applying the traditional rules of statutory construc-
tion to subsections (k)(l) and (k)(4), the sections were unambiguous
and did not need to be interpreted by the RTC. Furthermore, even if
they were ambiguous, the RTC's interpretation was unacceptable un-
der any standard of review.2
Judge Ebel agreed that Chevron provided guidance for appellate re-
view; however, he disagreed in the application of Chevron to the facts
of the cases. Instead, before invoking the Chevron tests, Judge Ebel
felt that the court should have first employed the traditional rules of
statutory construction to discern congressional intent. Thus, Judge
Ebel would not have invoked the Chevron tests until after he had ap-
plied the normal tools of statutory interpretation. He concluded that
after applying the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, the sta-
tute's intent was no longer ambiguous. 20'
Judge Ebel first looked to the McFadden Act. 2 He noted that sec-
tion 36(c) was the cornerstone branching authority for national banks
and represented congressional response to the tensions of a dual bank-
ing system. Judge Ebel believed that the RTC's interpretation of sub-
sections (k)(1) and ((k)(4) directly conflicted with the McFadden Act
and could not stand. He therefore concluded that the override regula-
tion was also unacceptable. 2 3
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 948.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 948-49.
201. Id. at 949
202. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1988).
203. Colorado State Banking Bd., 926 F.2d at 950.
1991] FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE BANKING LAW
After invalidating the regulation under the McFadden Act, Judge
Ebel analyzed the override provision, section 1823(k)(1)(A)(i). He
interpreted the section to allow the RTC to override any state law that
precludes a merger of a savings and loan with a bank. He reasoned
that this includes only state laws that straight out preclude such mer-
gers. He noted that neither New Mexico nor Colorado has a law
which per se prohibits mergers between banks and savings and loans.
Accordingly, in his opinion, that was the end of the matter. The court
need not look to the post-acquisition operation of the acquired thrift
branches. He believed that Congress did not intend to give the RTC
such broad powers, particularly via the tortured and subtle inferences
upon which the RTC relied.205
Nonetheless, Judge Ebel found that the RTC's reliance on the pro-
vision "notwithstanding any provision of state law" was misplaced.
He noted that it is not the state law which prohibited the operation of
the thrifts branches as banks, but instead federal law, i.e, the Mc-
Fadden Act.206 The McFadden Act incorporates state law by refer-
ence. Accordingly, because there is nothing in section
1823(k)(1)(A)(i)(I) that gives the RTC authority to override federal
law, the RTC cannot allow banks to operate the failed thrift branches
as branches of the bank. 20
Judge Ebel also criticized the majority's interpretation of the term
"merger." 201 He asserted that the term "merger" is defined only as
the legal joinder of two entities and has nothing to do with the opera-
tion of the surviving entity. He argued that the RTC's definition is
unsupported by case law, citing United States v. Connecticut National
Bank,209 which found that a bank merger was considered a merger
even though the banks intended to divest themselves of a number of
branch offices. 210
Alternatively, Judge Ebel argued, it is irrelevant whether a forced
divestiture is a merger, because state laws that prohibit branching do
not require the post-acquisition bank to disgorge customer deposits or
assets; instead, "the law simply prohibits it from operating the former
savings and loan branch offices as bank offices." '21
204. Id. at 950-51.
205. Id. at 951.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 952.
209. 418 U.S. 656, 659 (1974).
210. Colorado State Banking Bd., 926 F.2d at 952.
211. Id.
1021
1022 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:995
The dissent also discussed the FIRREA branching provision .1 2
Judge Ebel felt that section 1823(k)(4) is the most relevant portion of
FIRREA because it is the only section that expressly deals with branch
banking. He found that the section provided independent authority to
maintain branches in only two situations:
The first sentence provides that if the savings and loan is the survivor
in a merger or it survives as a separate entity in a consolidation,
transfer or acquisition, it may retain and operate its existing
branches even though it may be owned by a bank holding company.
The second sentence provides that if, after a merger, consolidation,
transfer or acquisition, the savings and loan continues to exist as a
separate entity, it may open new branches to the same extent as a
savings and loan that is not affiliated with a bank holding
company."t 3
Therefore, because the section expressly gives authority to operate
branches when they are part of an acquired savings and loan, then by
negative implication, Congress did not intend for banks to operate
branches if such activity would violate the McFadden Act. 214
Judge Edel noted that his interpretation was consistent with the
long established policies of the McFadden Act and the legislative his-
tory of FIRREA; he would have held the override regulation inva-
lid. 215
V. CONCLUSIONS
This author agrees with the conclusion of Judge Heaney that Con-
gress should address this question clearly and unambiguously. Two
important policy decisions need to be made in this area regarding the
integrity of the dual banking system and the cost to taxpayers of the
thrift bailout. First, if the RTC is to resolve cases of failed thrifts at
the least cost to taxpayers, then the override regulation should be up-
held because banks and bank holding companies will pay a premium
to acquire an already existing branch banking network. However, the
downside of enforcing the override regulation will be that large banks
will take over the market share of smaller, locally owned state banks
because the smaller banks may not be able to purchase entire branch-
ing networks. This may have the impact of forcing these smaller insti-
tutions out of business.
212. Id. at 953. See also supra note 141 (for text of branching provision).
213. Id. at 953-54.
214. Id. at 954.
215. Id. at 955.
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Second, Congress has statutorily dictated banking law for most of
the century. It has established an intricate set of laws which allow
state chartered banks and national banks to coexist. At the time of
publication of this Comment, nine federal judges have interpreted the
emergency acquisition provisions. Five judges agree that the RTC's
override regulation should be upheld, while four judges would reject
the regulation. In addition, the two courts of appeals which have con-
sidered the issue have rendered split decisions. The majority of both
circuits have upheld the regulation, but for different reasons. There-
fore, Congress, not the courts or the RTC, should be setting policy
and deciding whether banks and bank holding companies should be
able to encroach upon markets traditionally held by state chartered
banks at the expense of the dual banking system. Legislative guidance
is needed in this important area.

